Dalhousie University Schulich School of Law
From the SelectedWorks of Naiomi Metallic

2016

Indian Act By-Laws: A Viable Means for First
Nations to (Re)Assert Control Over Local
Matters Now and Not Later
Naiomi Metallic, Dalhousie University Schulich School of Law

Available at: https://works.bepress.com/naiomi-metallic/7/

INDIAN ACT BY-LAWS: A VIABLE MEANS FOR
FIRST NATIONS TO (RE)ASSERT CONTROL OVER
LOCAL MATTERS NOW AND NOT LATER
Naiomi Metallic*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Although by-law powers giving First Nation band councils (“First Nation
governments”) the power to pass laws on a variety of subjects relating to reserve
land and band members have existed within the Indian Act since the late 1800s, such
instruments have largely been seen by First Nation governments as being ineffective
at giving them control over local matters affecting the day-to-day lives of their
community members. This is primarily because the Indian Act gave the federal
Minister of the Department of Indian and Northern Affairs (today called “Indigenous
and Northern Affairs Canada” or “INAC” or “Department”) final say over whether
such by-laws could take effect (known as the disallowance power). In addition, the
Department adopted a narrow interpretation of the expanse of the Indian Act by-law
provisions, taking the position that any by-laws touching on issues that overlapped
with provincial powers would not receive Ministerial approval, thereby preventing
First Nation governments from passing laws setting community norms relating child
welfare, social assistance, education and a number of other areas. For these reasons,
First Nations have not seen the Indian Act by-laws as giving them any real form of
self-government.
However, some modest amendments to the Indian Act that recently came
into effect with little notice or fanfare may have significantly changed this state of
affairs. A private members’ bill, introduced by Rob Clarke, one of the few
Aboriginal Members of Parliament in Stephen Harper’s Conservative government,
called for the repeal of certain provisions in the Indian Act deemed to be antiquated
or paternalistic. Among these provisions was the Ministerial disallowance power.
The rest of the members of the Conservative party supported the bill and, in
December 2014, the amendments came into effect.
The significance of the amendment is to now empower First Nation
governments to pass by-laws as they see fit without any interference from INAC. Of
course, the exercise of such powers will still be limited to passing laws over subject
matters listed in the Indian Act (subject to review by the courts). However, despite
the fact that INAC previously took a restrictive interpretation of these powers,
modern interpretation and constitutional principles now support a broad, generous
and adaptive reading of the Indian Act by-laws, empowering First Nation
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governments to legislate over a wide range of local matters affecting their
communities. The by-law powers also make First Nation by-laws paramount over
provincial laws and federal laws in a number of cases. For all of these reasons, this
is an avenue for exercising self-government that First Nations governments should
now seriously consider.
I acknowledge there are principled objections to reliance on the Indian Act
by-laws as the source of self-government powers. Certainly, both the dark history of
the Indian Act as tool for assimilation and the status of by-laws as a form of
‘delegated’ governance powers make the prospect of using the Indian Act to advance
self-government somewhat unpalatable. While these are legitimate reservations,
facing the present alternative, which is no self-government for the vast majority of
First Nations with no prospect of self-government for years to come, and a desperate
need for First Nations to take control of key programs in their communities, selfgovernment via the Indian Act by-laws is, by far, the lesser of two evils.
II.

THE URGENT NEED FOR FIRST NATIONS TO EXERCISE SELF-GOVERNMENT
NOW

It is well documented that Indigenous peoples in Canada still experience greater
poverty, poorer health outcomes, greater risks of addictions, lower educational
attainment, lower annual income, over-incarceration, over-representation in the child
welfare system, and greater risk of experiencing violence than non-Indigenous
Canadians.1 The dire social conditions that First Nations people in this country
continue to face is tied to the colonial legacy of external domination and subjugation
of First Nations peoples.2 It is now widely acknowledge by numerous scholars and
important reports, such as the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples’ Report and
the Truth and Reconciliation Commission’s Final Report, that self-government is an
essential part of helping First Nations overcome this legacy.3 In particular, First
1

Assembly of First Nations, “Fact Sheet – Quality of Life of First Nations June 2011”, online:
<www.afn.ca/uploads/files/factsheets/quality_of_life_final_fe.pdf>; Indigenous and Northern Affairs
Canada, “The Community Well-Being Index: Well-Being in First Nations Communities, 1981-2011,”
(Ottawa: 2015); Daniel J K Beavon, Nicholas Spence & Jerry White, Aboriginal Well-Being: Canada’s
Continuing Challenge (Toronto: Thompson Education Publishing: 2007).

2

Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Honouring the Truth, Reconciling for the Future: Summary of
the Final Report of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada (Ottawa: 2015) at 1–23 [Truth
and Reconciliation Commission].

3

See Keith Penner, Indian Self-Government in Canada: Report of the Special Committee (Ottawa:
Queen’s Printer for Canada, 1983) [Penner]; Report of the Royal Commission of Aboriginal Peoples:
Restructuring the Relationship, vol 2 (Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada, 1996) at 131 [Aboriginal
Peoples Report, vol 2]; Truth and Reconciliation Commission, supra note 2 at 133; John H Hylton,
“The Case for Self-Government: A Social Policy Perspective” in John H Hylton, ed, Aboriginal SelfGovernment in Canada: Current Trends and Issues, 2nd ed (Saskatoon: Purich Publishing Ltd, 1999) 78;
John O’Neil, et al, “Community Healing and Aboriginal Self-Government” in John H Hylton, ed,
Aboriginal Self-Government in Canada: Current Trends and Issues, 2nd ed (Saskatoon: Purich
Publishing Ltd, 1999) 130; Sonia Harris-Short, Aboriginal Child Welfare, Self-Government and the
Rights of Indigenous Children – Protection the Vulnerable Under International Law (Burlington:
Ashgate Publishing Company, 2012) at 11–12.
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Nations need to be able to control matters affecting their day-to-day lives, including
in the areas of education, social development, child welfare, health, housing, landuse, policing and emergency services, to name a few.
Currently, most First Nations in Canada are not self-governing. Instead,
what is now in place in most First Nations is what is known as “program
devolution.”4 Program devolution is the transfer of resources and responsibility for
program delivery from INAC (and other federal departments that administer
programs to First Nations, such as Health Canada) to First Nations and their
institutions in accordance with terms and conditions set by the government. 5
Although there are varying definitions and models of First Nation self-government,
its core feature is real decision-making power resting in the hands of Indigenous
peoples.6 On this basis, program devolution is not self-government simply because it
is INAC (and other federal departments) that exercises control of the programs,
policies and budgets of First Nations.7
While program devolution may have been a well-intended policy designed
as a transitional tool to prepare First Nations to assume self-government, it is
problematic for a number of reasons.8 First, there is no legal framework for program
devolution; it operates purely on the basis of government policies, treasury board
authorities and appropriations, and funding agreements between INAC and First
Nations.9 This gives INAC staff extensive discretion and control over First Nations’
affairs and gives rise to potential for abuse, lack of oversight of departmental staff by
Parliament, and lack of accountability to First Nations peoples.10 Second, it has
created conditions allowing for the serious underfunding of First Nations
programming, exacerbating the poverty already existing in many First Nations
communities. 11 Finally, devolution does not encourage thoughtful, culturally
4

Judith Rae, “Program Delivery Devolution: A Stepping Stone of Quagmire for First Nations?” (2009)
7:2 Indigenous LJ 1 [Rae].

5

Ibid at 6-17; see also Stephen Cornell, Catherine Curtis & Miriam Jorgensen, “The Concept of
Governance and its Implications for First Nations” (2004) Joint Occasional Papers on Native Affairs,
No 2004-02, at 8–10 [Cornell, Curtis & Miriam].

6

Cornell, Curtis & Miriam, supra note 5 at 10–14.

7

Penner, supra note 3 at 20.

8

Rae, supra note 4 at 22–23; see also Constance MacIntosh, “Envisioning the Future of Aboriginal
Health Under the Health Transfer Process” (2008) Health LJ (Special Edition) 67 [MacIntosh,
“Envisioning the Future”].

9

Naiomi Metallic & Sébastien Grammond, “Ensuring Real Accountability on First Nations Reserves”
(2016) Caledon Institute of Social Policy, online: <www.caledoninst.org/Publications/
PDF/1087ENG%2Epdf> [Metallic & Grammond]; Constance MacIntosh, “Testing the Waters:
Jurisdictional and Policy Aspects of the Continuing Failure to Remedy Drinking Water Quality on First
Nations Reserves” (2008) 39:1 Ottawa L Rev 63

10

Metallic & Grammond, supra note 9.

11

Rae, supra note 4 at 25–30; Canada, Indigenous and Northern Affairs, Departmental Audit and
Evaluation Branch, Evaluation of the Alternative Funding Arrangement (AFA) and Flexible Transfer
Payment (FTP) Funding Authorities, (Ottawa, 2005); MacIntosh, “Envisioning the Future,” supra note
8; First Nations Child and Family Caring Society of Canada et al v Attorney General of Canada (for
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appropriate, policy-making sensitive to the particular needs and circumstance of First
Nations people.12 This is because INAC’s primary program delivery standard for
virtually all essential services, formulated in the mid-1960s with a view to
assimilating First Nations, which still persists today, requires First Nations to follow
provincial program standards (known as the provincial ‘comparability’ standard).13
In brief, instead of preparing or leading First Nations toward self-government,
program devolution seems to be worsening the plight of First Nations communities.14
In a 2011 Report, the Auditor General went so far as to state that the current system
on reserve “severely limit[s] the delivery of public services to First Nations
communities and hinder[s] improvements in living conditions on reserves.”15
Paired with this problem is the fact that the existing process for First
Nations to achieve self-government takes several years to conclude.16 To date, such
negotiations have only resulted in about a dozen concluded agreements. 17
Moreover, these negotiations were virtually stalled in the last decade under the
Conservative government of Stephen Harper.18 There was the aborted attempt by
Canada in 2002-03 to pass the First Nations Governance Act, which included
recognition of First Nations law-making powers over local and internal matters,19 but
the Minister of Indian and Northern Affairs Canada), 2016 CHRT 2 (CanLII) [First Nations Child and
Family Caring Society].
12

See Steve Jacob & Geoffroy Desautels, “Evaluation of Aboriginal Programs: What Place is Given to
Participation and Cultural Sensitivity” (2013) 4:2 Int J Indigenous Policy J 1.

13

Hugh Shewell & Annabella Spagnut, “The First Nations of Canada: social welfare and the quest for
self-government” in John E Dixon & Robert P Scheurell, eds, Social Welfare with Indigenous Peoples
(London: Routledge, 1995) 1 at 3–6 and 13 [Shewell & Spagnut]; Martin Papillon, “Playing Catch-up
with Ghosts: Income Assistance for First Nations on Reserve” in Daniel Béland & Pierre-Marc
Daigneault, eds, Welfare Reform in Canada: Provincial Social Assistance in Comparative Perspective
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2014).

14

See Rae, supra note 4; see also Cindy Blackstock, “The Canadian Human Rights Tribunal on First
Nations Child Welfare: Why if Canada wins, equality and justice must lose,” (2010) 33:1 Children and
Youth Services Review 187.

15

Canada, Office of the Auditor General, 2011 June Status Report of the Auditor General of Canada to
the House of Commons, Chapter 4, “Programs for First Nations on Reserves” at 5, online: <www.oagbvg.gc.ca/internet/docs/parl_oag_201106_04_e.pdf>.

16

See Jennifer E Dalton, “Aboriginal Title and Self-Government in Canada: What Is the True Scope of
Comprehensive Land Claims Agreements?” (2006) 22 Windsor Rev Leg & Soc Issues 29.

17

See Naiomi Metallic, “Les droits linguistiques des peoples autochtones” in Michel Bastarache & Michel
Doucet, eds, Les droits linguistiques au Canada, 3e ed (Montréal: Éditions Yvon Blais, 2013) at 935–
937.

18

See Andrew Stobo Sniderman & Justin Ferbey, “Yukon first nation worried self-government will
collapse without funding” The Globe and Mail (19 September 2012), online:
<www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/yukon-first-nation-worried-self-government-will-collapsewithout-funding/article4553822/>; Jorge Barrera, “PM Harper failing to fulfill Mulroney’s Oka promise
on modern treaties” Aboriginal Peoples Television Network (8 April 2015), online:
<aptn.ca/news/2015/04/08/pm-harper-failing-fulfill-mulroneys-oka-promise-modern-treaties/>.

19

Bill C-7, An Act respecting leadership selection, administration and accountability of Indian bands, and
to make related amends to other Act, 2nd sess, 37th Parl, 2002; see also Mary C Hurley, “Bill C-7: the
First Nations Governance Act” (Ottawa: Library of Parliament Legislative Summaries, 2002-2003),
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the federal government has yet to make any further attempts to revisit the concept of
Canada-wide legislation enabling self-government, despite the fact that some
scholars have suggested it is high time it do so.20
Taking these two problems together, First Nations governments in Canada
currently appear to be stuck between the proverbial “rock and a hard place” when it
comes to having a means to exercise effective control over programs and services
affecting their community members. It is possible that positive changes in this
direction may occur with the recent election of Justin Trudeau’s Liberal government,
which campaigned on improving Canada’s relationship with Indigenous peoples.
However, the process of reform—especially within government departments—can
be long and arduous and the need for change is urgent. With concluded selfgovernment agreements a long way off for many First Nations, and the prospect of
reform of the system of program devolution uncertain, a viable interim solution is
necessary because the status quo is unacceptable.
III. IN SEARCH OF AN INTERIM SOLUTION—REVISITING THE INDIAN ACT BY-LAW
POWERS

A. Introduction to the Indian Act by-law powers
The Indian Act by-law powers are provisions delegating a number of legislative
powers to Band Councils, the governing bodies of each First Nation band under the
Indian Act. 21 These powers, in some regards, resemble powers appearing in
municipal statutes. This has led some courts to make direct comparisons between
First Nations and municipal governments, 22 although more recent cases have
suggested that Bands Councils / First Nation governments, having both inherent and

online:
<www.lop.parl.gc.ca/About/Parliament/LegislativeSummaries/bills_ls.asp?Language=E&ls=
C7&Mode=1&Parl=37&Ses=2&source=library_prb>; Frank Cassidy, “The First Nations Governance
Act: A Legacy of Loss”, online: (2003) Policy Options <policyoptions.irpp.org/magazines/bigideas/the-first-nations-governance-act-a-legacy-of-loss/>; and John Provart, “Reforming the Indian Act:
First Nations Governance and Aboriginal Policy in Canada” (2003) 2 Indigenous LJ 177 [Provart].
20

John Borrows, “Legislation and Indigenous Self-Determination in Canada and the United States” in
Patrick Macklem & Douglas Sanderson, eds, From Recognition To Reconciliation: Essays On The
Constitutional Entrenchment Of Aboriginal And Treaty Rights (Toronto: University of Toronto Press,
2016) 474; Peter S Vicaire, “Two Roads Diverged: A Comparative Analysis of Indigenous Rights in a
North American Constitutional Context” (2013) 58 McGill LJ 607.

21

Indian Act, RSC 1985 c I-5, s 2(3). There are also other provisions in the Act and related legislation that
give legislative control to First Nation governments. The Indian Act allows Bands to assume control
over membership rules (s 10), as well as election and governance rules (s 2(1) and s 74). The recent
Family Homes on Reserves and Matrimonial Interests or Rights Act, SC 2013, c 20, ss 7–11, authorizes
First Nations to pass their own matrimonial property laws.

22

See R v Rice, 1980 CarswellQue 346, [1981] 1 CNLR 71 (CA).
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delegated-municipal powers, are more than merely a delegated government, but are
instead a sui generis form of government.23
Some form of by-law powers have appeared in successive versions of the
Indian Act and its predecessor statute dating back to 1869. An Act for the gradual
enfranchisement of Indians, the better management of Indian Affairs, and to extend
the provisions of the Act contained seven subjects over which the Chief of a band
could pass “rules and regulations,” subject to confirmation by the Governor in
Council.24 These seven subjects find their corollary in today’s version of the Indian
Act, and additional provisions were added incrementally over time.25
Currently, there are three types of by-law making powers in the Indian Act, each
having its own different procedural requirements for enactment.26 First there are the
‘general’ by-law powers, set out in s 81(1). Section 81(1) sets out 22 subject areas
that cover a range of topics including health, traffic, law and order, trespassing on
reserve, public games, animal control, public works, land allotment, zoning and
building standards, agriculture, wildlife management, commercial activities on
reserve, and residency and trespass on reserve. Finally, there is clause empowering
the passing of by-laws with respect to any matter arising out of or ancillary to the
exercise of power under s 81(1).27
Until as recently as December 2014, pursuant to s 82, copies of every band
by-law enacted pursuant to s 81(1) had to be forwarded to the federal Minister of
Aboriginal Affairs, who had the power to disallow the by-law.28 By-law infractions
can be punished on summary conviction by a fine not exceeding $1,000 or

23

Canadian Pacific Ltd v Matsqui Indian Band, [2000] 1 FCR 325, 176 DLR (4th) 35 at paras 29 and 44
(CanLII) [Canadian Pacific]; R v Ward (1988), 93 NBR (2d) 370, 45 CCC (3d) 280 at para 9 (QL) (NB
CA) [Ward]; and see also Jack Woodward, Native Law (Toronto: Thomson Reuters, 1994) at 7§665–
7§700 [Woodward].

24

31st Victoria, Chapter 42, SC 1869 (32 & 33 Vict), c 6, s 12.

25

A detailed legislative history is provided by Kent McNeil in “Challenging Legislative Infringement of
the Inherent Aboriginal Right of Self-Government” (2003) 22 Winsor YB Access Just 329 at 333-339,
350-351 [McNeil, “Challenging Legislative Infringement”].

26

Woodward, supra note 23 at 7§1250–7§1310.

27

Indian Act, supra note 21, s 81(1)(q). The failed Bill C-7, supra note 19, proposed reorganizing the bylaws powers and adding to them. Section 16 was titled “Laws for Local Purposes” and included half of
existing powers under s 81(1) and added “(d) the provision of services by or on behalf of the band” and
“(i) residential tenancies, including powers of eviction.” Section 17 was titled “Laws for Band
Purposes” and included the remaining s 81(1) powers, and added “the preservation of the culture and
language of the band.” Section 18, titled “Laws re band governance” gave new powers for bands to pass
by-laws over governance matters such as election process, meetings, conflicts of interests, etc. The Bill
was the subject of criticism for a variety of reasons. On the by-laws changes, some critics argued the
additions were not necessary, as the Indian Act already contained fairly broad by-law making powers
and were underused mainly because bands lacked enforcement resources and do not recognize these
powers as legitimate because of their delegated, municipal nature: see Provart, supra note 19 at 158.

28

Indian Act, supra note 21, s 82, as repealed by Indian Act Amendment and Replacement Act, SC 2014, c
38, s 7.
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imprisonment for up to 30 days, or both.29 In addition, the Act also provides for the
availability of injunctive relief to restrain a person from violating a by-law.30
The second type of by-law power in the Indian Act is the power to enact
‘money by-laws’ or ‘taxation bylaws.” These are set out at s 83 of the Act and
provide powers for passing taxation, licensing, and certain miscellaneous spending
by-laws.31 Such by-laws must have the approval of the Minister to come into effect,
and may be repealed or restricted by regulation.32 The final type of by-laws provided
for in the Indian Act are set out in s 85.1 and referred to as “intoxicant by-laws.”
These by-laws allow Band Councils to prohibit the possession, consumption, sale,
barter, supply or manufacture of intoxicants on reserve. Ministerial approval of
these by-laws is not required; however, these by-laws are only valid if they were
approved by a majority of electors of the band by vote at a special meeting.33
Finally, the Indian Act contains its own rules on dealing with conflicts between Band
by-laws and federal and provincial laws. As between a general s 81 by-law and
federal law, the opening provisions of s 81(1) suggest that provisions of the Indian
Act and regulations thereunder are paramount over band by-laws: “The council of a
band may make by-laws not inconsistent with this Act or with any regulation made
by the Governor in Council or the Minister, for any or all of the following
purposes…”34 However, this has been interpreted as meaning that Indian Act by-laws
will be paramount over other federal regulations, including regulations under the
federal Fisheries Act.35 This also implies that a by-law would be paramount over
federal legislation, though the question has yet to be ruled on by the courts.36

29

Indian Act, supra note 21, s 81(1)(r).

30

Ibid, s 81(2) and (3).

31

Ibid, s 83(1); see also Woodward, supra note 23 at para 7§1280. The Department has largely delegated
its responsibility over s 83 by-laws to the First Nations Tax Commission. For more information, see
<www.fntc.ca>.

32

Indian Act, supra note 21, s 83(2)–(6).

33

Ibid, s 85.1(2).

34

Ibid, s 81(1).

35

Ward, supra note 23; R v Jimmy (1987), 15 BCLR (2d) 145, [1987] 5 WWR 755 (BC CA). In R v
Lewis, [1996] 1 SCR 921, 133 DLR (4th) 700, the Supreme Court accepted (without deciding) the
agreement of counsel that a fisheries by-law pursuant to Indian Act, supra note 21, s 81(1)(o) would
supersede provisions of federal Fisheries Act regulations.

36

Normally, subordinate federal legislation cannot conflict with other Acts of Parliament, but an exception
exists where the enabling legislation so provides: see Friends of Oldman River Society v Canada
(Minister of Transport), [1992] 1 SCR 3 at 37, 88 DLR (4th) 1. The opening language of s 81(1)
appears to provide such an exception; however, some cases have strongly hinted that in situations of
conflict between Indian Act by-laws and the Criminal Code, the latter would prevail, although this
analysis is not supported by the language used in the Indian Act: see R v Stacey, [1982] 3 CNLR 158, 63
CCC (2d) 61 at paras 27–30 (WLN Can) (QC CA); R v Gladue, [1987] 4 CNLR 92, 30 CCC (3d) 308 at
para 29 (WLN Can) (Alta PC).
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As between provincial laws and band by-laws, the language of s 88
provides that any Band by-laws made pursuant to the Indian Act would be paramount
over conflicting provincial laws:
Subject to the terms of any treaty and any other Act of Parliament, all laws
of general application from time to time in force in any province are
applicable to and in respect of Indians in the province, except to the extent
that those laws are inconsistent with this Act or the First Nations Fiscal
Management Act, or with any order, rule, regulation or law of a band made
under those Acts…37

Cases to date have confirmed that in the case of a direct conflict between
Indian Act by-laws and provincial laws and regulations, the by-law supersedes
conflicting provincial legislation as a matter of paramountcy.38
Where the federal government might have concerns about an Indian Act bylaw being paramount over a federal or provincial law, s 73(1) of the Indian Act gives
the Governor in Council regulatory powers somewhat resembling the powers in s
81(1), in theory allowing the government to ‘fix’ at least some situations of conflict
it finds unacceptable.39 Of course, it also remains open to Parliament to amend the
Indian Act by-law powers. Unilateral changes to the Indian Act by-law powers,
whether by regulation or legislation, however, could potentially raise arguments of a
violation of the Aboriginal right to self-government.40
B. A means to exercise control over local matters?
It is the s 81(1) by-law powers that I believe hold the most promise of allowing First
Nations governments to immediately take control over local matters affecting their
communities, including in the pressing area of essential services on reserve, such as
child welfare, social assistance and in education. First of all, there is precedent of
the Department interpreting the s 81(1) by-law powers to permit a First Nation from
British Columbia to pass its own by-law over child welfare.
In 1980, faced with the staggering statistic that, over the past two decades,
at least 150 children had been removed from their small First Nation community by
provincial child welfare authorities and placed into non-First Nations foster and
adoptive homes, the members of the Spallumcheen First Nation in British Columbia
37

Indian Act, supra note 21, s 88 [emphasis added]. This would also be the result of application of the
constitutional principles of paramountcy: Peter Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada: 2014 Student
Edition (Toronto: Carswell, 2014) at 28-14.1 and 28-15.

38

R v Charles (1997), 159 Sask R 126, [1998] 1 WWR 515 (Sask QB); R v Meechance, 2000 SKQB 156,
193 Sask R 109.

39

Indian Act, supra note 21, s 73(1). An actual example of this is the by-law power over the regulation of
traffic on reserve. Although a band can regulate traffic on reserve pursuant to s 81(1)(b), its cannot pass
by-laws that are inconsistent with the provisions of the Indian Reserve Traffic Regulations CRC, c 959,
which incorporate by reference provincial motor vehicle laws and regulations.

40

See McNeil, “Challenging Legislative Infringement,” supra note 25.
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were compelled to take action. They staged a massive demonstration involving
hundreds of First Nations people marching in downtown Vancouver, decrying the
frequency with which provincial child welfare officials removed first Nations
children from their families and communities. This ultimately resulted in the
provincial and federal governments’ accepting the Spallumcheen First Nation’s
exercise of law-making jurisdiction over child welfare in the community through the
passage of an Indian Act by-law. 41
Passed in 1980, the Spallumcheen Indian Band By-law #3 – A By-law of the
Care of our Indian Children cites both the inherent right of self-determination and
the Indian Act by-law provisions as its enabling authority, namely s 81(1)(a), the
power “to provide for the health of residents on the reserve,” s 81(1)(c), the power
over “the observance of law and order,” and s 81(1)(d), the power over “the
prevention of disorderly conduct and nuisances.”42 The by-law also stipulates that it
was approved by a unanimous vote of the band members at a general meeting, as
well as a unanimous vote of the Band Council. The preamble of the by-law sets out
the urgency and need for the Band to assume control over child welfare:
The Spallumcheen Indian Band finds:
(a) that there is no resource that is more vital to the continued
existence and integrity of the Indian Band than our children.
(b)

that an alarmingly high percentage of Indian families are broken
up by the removal, often unwarranted, of their children from
them by non-band agencies.

(c) that the removal of our children by non-band agencies and the
treatment of the children while under the authority of non-band
agencies has too often hurt our children emotionally and serves
to fracture the strength of our community, thereby contributing
to social breakdown and disorder within our reserve.

The by-law consists of 23 provisions and its key features include giving the
Band exclusive jurisdiction over any child custody proceeding involving an Indian
child who is a member of the Band, making the Chief and Council the legal
guardians of any such children taken into care, imposing a principle of rebuilding
families whenever possible, and instituting a hierarchy of child placement options
which give clear priority to placement on reserve and with other First Nations

41

Patrick Johnson, Native Children and the Child Welfare System (Canadian Council on Social
Development in association with James Lorimer & Company: Toronto, 1983), at 107–108.

42

The entire text of the by-law is appended to the decision of Alexander v Maxime (1995), 4 BCLR (3d)
294, 56 BCAC 97 (BC CA).
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people.43 The by-law provides that “only as a last resort shall the child be placed in
the home of a non-Indian living off the reserve.”44
As noted, the Department in essence ‘approved’ this by-law by not
disallowing it. However, after the Spallumcheen by-law, for reasons unknown, the
Department was unwilling to permit any other similar by-laws. A manual on bylaws produced by the Department in 1996 adopted a narrow interpretation of the bylaw powers. In relation to the by-law power respecting “the health of residents on
reserve” in s 81(1)(a), the Department took the position that “[p]aragraph (a) does
not provide Band Councils with the authority to make by-laws regarding social
services. The Constitution Act, 1867 gives provincial governments’ exclusive
jurisdiction over social services.”45
The powers that the manual suggested could be exercised in this regard
were insignificant, such as pest and animal control, garbage disposal and health
hazards. With respect to the power over “law and order” in s 81(1)(c), the manual
limited this power to such things as regulating curfews and public meetings. The
Department apparently took the view that Band by-laws could not overlap with
subjects legislated on by provincial governments. While one author encouraged First
Nations to challenge INAC’s position in this regard through judicial review, this
does not appear to have occurred.46
Although the position taken by the Department in its manual was
inconsistent with its approval of the Spallumcheen by-law, the Department never
subsequently moved to disallow the Spallumcheen by-law and it remains valid
today.47 Nor has the by-law been declared ultra vires in the courts, although the
British Columbia Court of Appeal, in a 1995 case, suggested without deciding that it
was a possible intrusion into the powers of the provinces under s 92 of the

43

Spallumcheen Indian Band, by-law No 3, A By-law of the Care of our Indian Children, (1980), ss 3(a),
5, and 10.
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Department of Indian and Northern Affairs Canada, “Band Governance By-Law Manual” (1996) ch 3 at
2 (emphasis in original).
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John W Gailus, “Utilizing Indian Act By-Laws as a Tool of Self-Government” (Paper presented at the
Native Courtworkers and Counselling Association of British Columbia’s “Aboriginal People and the
Law Programme, 11 April 2011), online: <http://www.dgwlaw.ca/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/
Bylaws_Paper.pdf >.
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Although there was no specific provision within the Indian Act, the Department took the position that it
had the power to revoke a by-law even after it had come into effect: see Woodward, supra note 23 at
7§1420.
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Constitution, Act, 1867.48 However, in subsequent cases, the validity of the by-law
has been taken for granted.49
If the specific by-law provisions referenced as the enabling authority for the
Spallumcheen by-law, namely the powers over “health of residents on reserve,”
“observance of law and order” and “prevention of disorderly conduct and nuisances”
are capable of authorizing jurisdiction over child welfare, then it would seem that
such provisions are equally capable of authorizing jurisdiction over most, if not all,
of the other subjects we commonly recognize as being essential services, such as
public health, social welfare, education, child care, policing, and emergency
services.50 If such is the case, owing to the conflict rules discussed above, this would
permit Indian Act by-laws in areas such as child welfare, social assistance, child care
and other areas to be paramount over provincial laws in cases of conflict. This holds
significant promise for addressing First Nations communities’ need to be able to take
effective control over local matters, in particular essential services on reserve. This
is especially so now, since the repeal of the s 82 Ministerial disallowance power in
December 2014.
The repeal was part of a Private Members’ bill, Bill C-428, An Act to amend
the Indian Act (publication of by-laws) and to provide for its replacement, was
introduced by Manitoba Conservative Member of Parliament Rob Clarke in 2012
and received Royal Assent on December 16, 2014.51 The bill provided for the
removal of outdated or antiquated clauses in the Indian Act.52 With respect to the bylaw powers, the bill repealed the disallowance power and changed the publication
requirement for by-laws.53 The remaining by-law provisions were left intact.54 On
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Alexander v Maxime, supra note 42 at para 11 (WLN Can). Note there is one article from the early
1980s that suggests the by-law is invalid: see John A MacDonald, “The Spallumcheen Indian Band ByLaw and Its Potential Implications for Children Welfare Policy in British Columbia” (1983) 4:1 Can J
Fam L 75. The conclusions of the author, an associate professor in social work, are questionable as very
little legal analysis informs the conclusion, except s 88 of the Indian Act.
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See S (EG) v Spallumcheen Band Council, [1999] 2 CNLR 306.
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Apart from cases on the Spallumcheen by-law, Ross v Mohawk Council of Kanesatke, 2003 FCT 531,
[2003] 3 CNLR 313 suggests that the Indian Act by-law powers provided jurisdiction over policing on
reserve.

51
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38, ss 7–9.
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For a description of the changes, see Indigenous and Northern Affairs Canada, “Overview of Bill C-428
Amendments to the Indian Act,” online <www.aadnc-aandc.gc.ca/eng/1422387592930/
1422387686680> [Indigenous and Northern Affairs Canada, “Overview”].
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It is interesting to note that requirement for Ministerial approval of s 83 by-laws was not repealed by the
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first reading, Mr. Clarke introduced the proposed repeal of the disallowance power
as “return[ing] control of the publication of bylaws to first nations’ governance
bodies.”55 On second reading, the Parliamentary Secretary to INAC described the
object of the changes as “plac[ing] responsibility for these bylaw-making powers
squarely back in the hands of the first nation, where it belongs…”56 INAC’s website
now states, “[a]s a result [of the repeal], First Nations will have autonomy over the
enactment and coming into force of by-laws and the day-to-day governance of their
communities.”57
It would therefore seem that the intent behind the repeal was to give a broad
power of control over local affairs (back) to the First Nations, as the reference to
“autonomy over … day-to-day governance” by the Department suggests. Certainly,
First Nations Band Councils are now free to attempt pass all manner of by-laws
arguably authorized by s 81(1). However, as was the case before the repeal of the
disallowance power, the ultimate determination of the validity of Indian Act by-laws
will fall to the courts. The remainder of this paper will consider, in particular,
whether the courts would give a broad interpretation to the s 81(1) by-law powers
and uphold Indian Act by-laws in the areas of essential services.58
C. Are s 81 by-laws on essential services valid?
1. General principles
Although the validity of the Spallumcheen by-law was questioned by the British
Columbia Court of Appeal in 1995, the issue has never been decided. Further, the
cases that have considered the validity of the Indian Act by-law powers to date, most
stemming from the 1980s and 1990s and mostly about gambling by-laws, are likely
of little assistance in deciding this issue.59 Moreover, there is a strong argument that
described at length in Canadian Pacific, supra note 23. In any event, to the extent there is some overlap
between s 81 and s 83, s 81 will supersede s 83 given the language in s 83(1) that it operates, “without
prejudice to the powers conferred by s 81.”
55

House of Commons Debates, 41st Parl, 1st Sess, Vol 146, No 133 (4 June 2012) (Rob Clarke).
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House of Commons Debates, 41st Parl, 1st Sess, Vol 146, No 187 (28 November 2012) (Greg
Rickford).
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The s 81(1) by-law powers also arguably permit Band Councils to legislate in areas of federal
jurisdiction, some of the more contentious of these being in areas of criminal law such as gaming and
gambling and controlled substances. It is beyond the scope of this paper to analyze whether modern
interpretative and constitutional principles support the validity of such by-laws. I would only say that,
although earlier court decisions were unfavourable to First Nation by-laws in these areas (see St Mary’s
Indian Band v Canada (Minister of Indian Affairs & Northern Development), [1995] 3 FC 461, 127
DLR (4th) 686; R v Gottfriedson, [1995] BCJ No 1791 (QL)) the conclusions in these cases may
deserve re-examination in light of the significant evolution in interpretation and constitutional principles
discussed below.
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those cases are outdated as they were decided prior to what appears to have been a
real shift in the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence around governance powers. In
Reference re Secession of Quebec, the Supreme Court recognized that “our
constitutional history demonstrates that that our governing institutions have adapted
and changed to reflect changing social and political values.” 60 The Court’s
jurisprudence since then has been a testament to this and key in this regard has been
the Court’s development of the constitutional principle of federalism.
First, the principle has facilitated greater recognition by the Court of the
concurrent exercise of power over the same subject matter. In fact, in Canadian
Western Bank v Alberta, the Court observed that federalism recognizes “that
overlapping powers are unavoidable” and our constitutional law has developed
various flexible techniques to accommodate such overlap, which was preferred over
an approach that reserves power to one government exclusively (i.e., the doctrine of
interjurisdictional immunity).61 In the companion case, British Columbia (AG) v
Lafarge Canada Inc, where application of the doctrine of interjurisdictional
immunity would have resulted in no regulation (as the federal government had not
regulated), Binnie J, for the majority of the Court commented, “federalism does not
require (nor, in the circumstances, should it tolerate) a regulatory vacuum.”62
Second, the principle of federalism promotes diversity in governance.63 In
the Secession Reference the Court recognize that the concepts of political and
cultural diversity underpinned our constitutional structure:
Federalism was a legal response to the underlying political and cultural
realities that existed at Confederation and continue to exist today. … The
federal-provincial division of powers was a legal recognition of the
diversity that existed among the initial members of Confederation, and
manifested a concern to accommodate that diversity within a single nation
by granting significant powers to provincial governments.64

This notion of diversity underlying federalism was expanded on in the
Secession Reference to inform a further independent constitutional principle of
respect for minorities. The Court observed that the protection of minority rights was
clearly an essential consideration in the constitutional structure at the time of
Confederation, and that principle was further reflected in a number of provisions in
both the Constitution Act, 1867 and the Constitution Act, 1982, including in the
explicit recognition for existing Aboriginal and Treaty rights in s 35.65
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Finally, the principle of federalism, through promoting diversity in
governance, spawned yet another principle, that of subsidiarity. This principle first
emerged (though unnamed) in the Secession Reference when the Court noted that
“the federal structure of our country facilitates democratic participation by
distributing power to the government thought to be most suited to achieving the
particular societal objective having regard to this diversity.”66 Later in 114957
Canada Ltée (Spraytech, Société d’arrosage) v Hudson (Town), the Court named this
principle the “principle of subsidiarity” and set out its contours more specifically:
“[t]his is the proposition that law-making and implementation are often best achieved
at a level of government that is not only effective, but also closest to the citizens
affected and thus most responsive to their needs, to local distinctiveness, and to
population diversity.”67
In Spraytech, the principle of subsidiarity was used first, to inform a broad
interpretation of the by-law powers of a municipal government;68 second, to clarify
that “the mere existence of provincial (or federal) legislation in a given field does not
oust municipal prerogatives to regulate the subject matter[;]”69 and third, to clarify
that the “operational conflict” test applied in cases of provincial-municipal
conflicts.70
Overall, the development of the principle of federalism and the related
principles of subsidiarity, diversity in governance and respect for minorities appears
to have created more room for delegated governments, such as municipalities, both
in terms of scope of their powers and the ability of their laws to co-exist alongside
similar laws passed by other levels of government. These principles are just as
applicable and beneficial to First Nation governments as they are to municipalities,71
if not more so given the status of First Nations governments as more than merely a
delegated government, but as a sui generis form of government.72
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241 at para 3 [Spraytech].

68

Ibid at paras 18–32.

69

Ibid at paras 39.
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2. Validity of Indian Act By-Laws
The question of whether Indian Act by-laws on essential services would be valid in
essence requires two inquiries: one based on administrative law, that is, whether such
by-laws are authorized under their enabling legislation, and another based on
constitutional law, that is, whether such by-laws are constitutionally valid. The
administrative law question is largely a matter of statutory interpretation, though the
constitutional principles cited above inform this analysis as well.
i. Administrative validity
The cases interpreting the Indian Act by-law powers to-date appear to have taken an
‘original meaning’ interpretation.73 This is the approach that takes the meaning of a
statutory provision to be what the original drafters of the statute would have
understood the language to permit the day after it was passed.74 This approach
presents significant challenges for interpreting Indian Act by-laws as authorizing bylaws on essential services. This is because the “health of residents on reserve” and
“law and order” by-law powers appeared in the earliest incarnation of the Indian Act
in 1869, well before the creation of the modern welfare state following the Second
World War and the proliferation of contemporary essential services legislation. It is
therefore highly unlikely that Parliament, in 1869, had in mind that Chiefs or Band
Councils would exercise such legislative powers.
There are several reasons why the original meaning rule should not inform
the interpretation of the Indian Act by-law powers. First, the rule has been the
subject of criticism, notably that it prevents interpretations that allow meaning to
adapt to social change.75 It also appears inconsistent with the interpretive principle
codified in s 10 of the federal Interpretation Act, that provides that “[t]he law shall
be considered as always speaking,”76 which is intended to indicate to courts that
adapting legislation to change is a normal and necessary part of interpretation.77
Further, in the context of Indian Act by-laws, the original meaning rule also
clashes with a number of other interpretative rules. One of these is the rule that
legislation relating to Aboriginal peoples should receive a large, liberal and
purposive interpretation and doubts and ambiguities should be resolved in favour of
Aboriginal peoples, often called the “Nowegijick principle.” 78 The Nowegijick
73

For example, in St. Mary’s Indian Band, supra note 58, the Federal Court held that by-laws pursuant to
s 81(1)(m) were ultra vires Band Councils as Parliament dealt conclusively with these matters in the
Criminal Code and it would have been intention of the drafters that a power over “games” would
include gambling.
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principle supports a liberal interpretation of the Indian Act by-laws; however, it is
not the strongest argument in favour of a broad reading of the s 81 by-laws powers.
This is because, although the Supreme Court often cites this principle, it often
underplays its application in practice. For example, in R v Lewis, a case about a band
fishing by-law, Lamer J cited the principle but emphasized that the Indian Act must
nonetheless be interpreted with a view to elucidating what it was that Parliament
wished to effect in enacting the particular section in question.79 The Nowegijick
principle therefore appears to be subordinate to the rule giving effect to the intention
of Parliament at the time of enacting the provision.
A more compelling argument that these by-laws are authorized under the
enabling statute is that the Indian Act by-law provisions can be characterized as
“quasi-constitutional” in nature. 80
Characterizing legislation as “quasiconstitutional” has several implications, one of these being that, in addition to
attracting a liberal and purposive interpretation, general terms in the statute will be
read as being adaptive to changing social conditions.81 The designation of “quasiconstitutional” has been applied to legislation touching on subjects deemed by the
courts to be ‘fundamental’ to human existence, development and dignity, such as
human rights, privacy and official languages legislation.82 The designation has also
been used for legislation constituting municipal governments.83 In Old St Boniface
Residents Assn v Winnipeg (City), La Forest J suggested that a planning by-law of
the city of Winnipeg was a quasi-constitutional instrument given that it served as a
framework or foundation for the city’s zoning and planning. 84 It would seem,
therefore, that a statute can be characterized as “quasi-constitutional” if its subject
matter involves fundamental human or civil rights (i.e., it is reminiscent of
provisions in the Constitution Act, 1982), or is foundational to the exercise of
governance powers (i.e., it is reminiscent of the division of powers in the
Constitution Act, 1867).
Being about the autonomy of Band Councils to pass self-governing by-laws,
the Indian Act by-law powers (considered apart from the rest of the Indian Act) fit
into both categories. The right to self-government, as part of the larger right of selfdetermination, is recognized as a fundamental collective human right of Indigenous

79

R v Lewis, supra note 35 at para 66. With this in mind, Iaccobucci J focused mainly on the usage of the
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peoples under international law.85 The by-law powers also set out foundational
governance powers of Band Councils, similar to legislation constituting municipal
governments. For these reasons, the Indian Act by-law powers ought to be read as
being adaptable to changing social conditions, including the important need for First
Nations to take greater control of local matters, such as key essential services in their
communities.
Further compelling interpretative arguments arise from the Spraytech
decision. The case involved a municipality that adopted a by-law restricting the use
of pesticides pursuant to its power to make by-laws to “secure peace, order, good
government, health and general welfare in the territory of the municipality” under s
410(1) of the province’s municipal legislation.86 Local landscaping and lawn care
companies challenged the validity of the legislation, alleging the pesticide by-law
was in conflict with both provincial and federal legislation.87 The Supreme Court
upheld the validity of the by-laws. The majority’s decision was informed by the
principle of subsidiarity. In this regard, the majority found the open-ended or
“omnibus” language of s 410(1) to confer on municipalities the ability to address
new challenges, without requiring amendment of the provincial enabling
legislation.88 By acting to minimize the use of allegedly harmful pesticides in order
to promote the health of its inhabitants, the by-law fell squarely within the “health”
component of s 410(1).89 A significant factor in this determination was the fact that
the town’s pesticides by-law arose in response to many residents’ concerns about the
use of pesticides and requests of the city to take action.90 What this demonstrates,
without the Court specifically saying so, was the majority taking an adaptive
approach to the interpretation of the by-law powers, allowing the interpretation of s
410(1) to adapt to changing social conditions.
In the context of Indian Act by-laws, taken cumulatively, s 81(1)(a), (c) and
(d) have similar language to that found in the “omnibus” clause in Spraytech, save
for the specific reference to “general welfare” in the Indian Act by-law powers.
Arguably, there is little distinction between “health of residence on the reserve” and
“general welfare” if the former is interpreted generously. In addition, the
Spallumcheen by-law is precedent that “health of residents on reserve” can be
interpreted to include jurisdiction over child welfare services.
Another relevant interpretative principle in Spraytech was the majority’s
finding that international human rights law informed the interpretation of by-law
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powers.91 This principle also finds support in a number of cases that have relied on
the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples to interpret
domestic law.92 As it relates to powers of Band Councils to pass by-laws over
essential services on reserve, the UNDRIP recognizes that Indigenous people have
the right to self-determination,93 and Article 4 provides: “Indigenous peoples, in
exercising their right to self-determination, have the right to autonomy or selfgovernment in matters relating to their internal and local affairs, as well as ways and
means for financing their autonomous functions.”94 Numerous other provisions in
the UNDRIP further support Indigenous control over areas of essential services
affecting them.95
Finally, in addition to international law principles, our own domestic
constitutional principles promoting federalism in the form of diversity of governance
and respect of minorities, discussed above, further bolster an interpretation of the
Indian Act by-law powers as authorizing Band Councils’ power to legislate over
local matters affecting them.
ii. Constitutional validity
Assuming a Band by-law on essential services would be authorized pursuant to the
Indian Act, there remains the question whether, as a delegated form of federal law, it
unconstitutionally intrudes on provincial powers. Provinces clearly have authority
over the provision of essential services within the province under the power over
“Property and Civil Rights in the Province.”96
On a pith and substance analysis, the first question would be whether the
federal government could legislate on essential services in relation to “Indians and
Lands reserved for the Indians.”97 Although the federal government has largely
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refrained from legislating on essential services on reserve,98 I suggest that this is
motivated more by lack of political will rather than a concern of lack of jurisdiction.
Peter Hogg has opined that the courts likely would find the federal government has
jurisdiction to pass laws relating to First Nations on subjects that would otherwise be
viewed as coming under provincial jurisdiction:
What kinds of laws may be made in relation to Indians? The federal
Parliament has taken the broad view that it may legislate for Indians on
matters which otherwise lie outside its legislative competence, and on
which it could not legislate for non-Indians. …
If s. 91(24) merely authorized Parliament to make laws for Indians which
it could make for non-Indians, then the provision would be unnecessary.
It seems likely, therefore, that the courts would uphold laws which could
be rationally related to intelligible Indian policies, even if the laws would
ordinarily be outside federal competence. This is not to deny Lysyk’s
caveat about the danger of assuming that a law which applies only to
Indians is a law “in relation to” Indians. For example, a law which
stipulated a special speed limit for Indians driving automobiles on public
highways would be hard to sustain as an “Indian” law, because it does not
seem to bear any relationship to any intelligible legislative policy in regard
to Indians.99

Hogg’s suggestion for the test of when federal legislation (or a delegated
by-law) overlapping provincial powers is valid—when there exist intelligible policy
reasons to justify special rules for Indians—is helpful. In the case of Band by-laws
on essential services, this would ensure the rules are culturally competent by meeting
the particular needs and circumstances of First Nations peoples and their
communities. This is an intelligible policy justification for having special rules for
First Nations. Thus, there is a strong case for finding Indian Act by-laws on
essential services to be, in pith and substance, in relation to s. 91(24) and any overlap
with provincial jurisdiction would constitute merely incidental effects. 100 In
addition, the fact that the constitutional doctrine known as ‘singling out’ operates to
prevent provinces from legislating special rules for First Nations (whether for
ameliorative or adverse purposes), bolsters the case.101
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Another compelling argument is that neither Parliament nor the provinces,
for the most part, wish to legislate in the area of essential services on reserve. For
more than 50 years, each has been saying the other is responsible for providing
essential services to First Nations. 102
If neither the federal nor provincial
governments are willing to assume jurisdiction in relation to essential services on
reserve, then the Courts should be reluctant to rule that First Nations lack
jurisdiction. The observation made by Justices Binne and LeBel in Lafarge that
“federalism does not require (nor, in the circumstances, should it tolerate) a
regulatory vacuum” is apt.103
Finally, the principle of subsidiary, that law making is “best achieved at a
level of government that is not only effective, but also closest to the citizens
affected” 104 and the promotion of diversity in governance and respect for
minorities—here, the respect for First Nation governments which have the right to
self-determination and self-governance recognized both in domestic and
international law—clearly militate in favour of a finding of constitutional validity of
essential services by-laws passed by First Nation governments.
IV. MOVING FORWARD WITH SELF-GOVERNMENT VIA INDIAN ACT BY-LAWS
Based on the above analysis, there is a credible basis to argue that, pursuant to
adaptive reading of the s 81 power over “health of residents on reserve” and “law
and order”, First Nations have the authority to pass by-laws over child welfare
matters on reserve, provide for culturally-appropriate programming for social
development, including eligibility criteria and rates relating to social assistance, and
create programs related to child care, care of the elderly and those with a disability. It
would also be reasonable to view these powers as extending to all matters of local
and internal nature affecting the well-being of First Nations individuals, children
families or the community as a whole, language preservation, education and culture,
community health and safety and policing issues.
The exact end limits of these powers are difficult to define in the abstract,
but there are tools available to assist in this effort. The rights set out in the UNDRIP
are a helpful indication of the types of rights Indigenous communities ought to have
provision does not render it ultra vires the province” at para 66. Post-Kitkatla, it would still appear that
provincial legislation giving special treatment specifically to Aboriginal people would be ultra vires.
But see Jean Leclair, “The Kitkatla Decision: Finding Jurisdictional Room to Justify Provincial
Regulation of Aboriginal Matters” (2003) 21 SCLR (2d) 73. See also Kent McNeil, “Culturally
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control over for the well-being of those communities. Indeed, this is precisely what
Justice Binnie did in his concurring reasons in Mitchell v MNR, looking to the
provisions of the UNDRIP to assist their determination on the outer-limits of a
potential Aboriginal right to cross-border trade.105 As well, the test proposed by
Hogg for when a federal law for Indians may overlap provincial jurisdiction—when
there exists intelligible policy reasons to justify special rules for Indians—will most
certainly be useful in helping define the outer counters of such rights.
It should be noted that exercising self-government via Indian Act by-laws
represents only half the solution to the problems presented by current system of
program devolution. The problem of inadequate funding for First Nations services
will still remain. Although some First Nations generate a significant amount of their
own revenue, most First Nations (like other governments) require transfer payments
from the federal government in order to finance program and service delivery.
Currently, unlike the equalization, health and social transfer agreements between the
federal government and the provinces, the fiscal agreements between Canada and
First Nations are made under strict conditions, notably the requirement for First
Nations to follow the programs terms and conditions set by the Canadian
government (which, as noted earlier, requires First Nations to follow standards
comparable to provincial standards).106
There is therefore an obvious tension between First Nations asserting
control over their programs through by-law powers and the terms of existing funding
agreements.
However, a recent landmark decision from the Canadian Human
Rights Tribunal regarding funding for child welfare services on reserve may provide
grounds to challenge the Department should its official insist on adherence to INAC
terms and conditions in order for First Nations to receive funding.107 This is because,
in addition to finding that child welfare services on reserve were discriminatory due
to the inadequate provision of funding, the Tribunal also held that the requirement
that the funding standards mirror provincial standards was discriminatory, as it failed
to reflect the needs and circumstances of First Nations children and families and was
not culturally appropriate. The Tribunal stated:
[H]uman rights principles, both domestically and internationally, require
[INAC] to consider the distinct needs and circumstances of First Nations
children and families living on-reserve – including their cultural, historical
and geographical needs and circumstances – in order to ensure equality in
the provision of child and family services to them. A strategy premised on
comparable funding levels, based on the application of standard funding
formulas, is not sufficient to ensure substantive equality in the provision of
105

Mitchell v MNR, 2001 SCC 33 at paras 81–84, [2001] 1 SCR 911.

106

See Scott Serson, “Reconciliation: for First Nations this must include Fiscal Fairness” in Gregory
Younging, Jonathan Dewar & Mike DeGagné, eds, Response, Responsibility, and Renewal: Canada’s
Truth and Reconciliation Journey (Ottawa: Aboriginal Healing Foundation, 2009) 163 at 170.

107

First Nations Child and Family Caring Society, supra note 11. The Canadian government will not
appeal the decision: “Federal government won’t appeal ruling that found it discriminated against
children on reserves” CBC News (22 February 2016), online: <http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/federalgovernment-not-appeal-children-reserves-1.3458969>.

232

UNBLJ

RD UN-B

[VOL/TOME 67

child and family services to First Nations children and families living onreserve.108

It follows that if funding formulas requiring provincial comparability are
discriminatory for failing to account for First Nations needs and circumstances, so
are program standards requiring provincial comparability. Thus, if Canada were to
withhold funding to a First Nations because it wanted to follow its own communitybased standards set out in its by-laws, Canada’s insistence on First Nations’
adherence to INAC’s program standards would be vulnerable to challenge as
discriminatory for clearly disregarding the First Nations’ legitimate preference for
community-based, culturally relevant standards.109
The Indian Act by-law powers’ status as a ‘delegated’ form of governance,
as opposed to a recognition of an inherent right to self-government, is a principled
objection that First Nations governments who explore such powers will have to be
prepared to address. Although this argument is legitimate, as I have argued, given
the status quo on reserve, pragmatism should prevail: it is better to have some form
of effective control of local matters and programs and service now than none at all.
As well, in the past, this objection appears to have been primarily related to the fact
that by-laws were subject to Ministerial approval, which is no longer the case.110
Moreover, although there are many scholars and lower courts who have taken for
granted that the legislative powers arising under self-government and modern-day
treaties are a recognition of the inherent right of self-government, at least one
appellate decision has characterized these treaties as delegations of provincial and
federal powers.111 In practice, there may be very little difference between exercising
‘delegated’ powers and exercising ‘inherent’ powers in terms of permitting effective
control by First Nations. Furthermore, as was done in the Spallumcheen by-law, a
First Nation could cite both the relevant Indian Act by-law powers as well as the
inherent right to self-government as the source of its authority. It is also worth
pointing out that, as compared to negotiated self-government where questions of
paramountcy between laws remain to be negotiated and leaving question of the
extent to which First Nations laws will be subordinate to conflicting provincial or
federal laws uncertain, the Indian Act by-law powers provide relatively strong
paramountcy rules in favour of First Nations’ by-laws.
Obviously, as First Nation governments begin to contemplate the exercise
of by-law powers over essential services, there will be many further issues to
consider. Given that many First Nations face serious capacity issues (both in terms
108
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of financial and human resources), it would likely be more effective for First Nations
to work together in preparing draft by-laws. While by-laws are passed on a band-byband basis, there is nothing preventing groupings of Bands, by Indigenous Nation or
by region for example, from seeking to adopt identical by-laws simultaneously to
provide for uniform law applying on all reserves in a geographic region.112
The by-law powers also give flexibility to Bands to proceed at their own
pace in terms of law-making, allowing them to borrow from federal or provincial
laws through incorporation by reference as deemed appropriate (so long as there are
some differences in content to meet the test identified by Hogg for justifying special
rules for Aboriginal peoples),113 and also to amend their laws to incorporate greater
amounts of Indigenous laws, concepts and principles over time. Further, in the
drafting process, subject matter experts ought to be consulted, especially those with
familiarity of the short-comings with provincial laws which adversely impact First
Nations peoples, as should lawyers with legislative drafting experience.
Although not technically required by the by-law provisions, a community
vote evidencing significant support for a by-law would add to the by-law’s political
legitimacy, as was done in the case of the Spallumcheen by-law.114 As well, as in
Spraytech¸ community support can inform the need for courts to interpret the by-law
powers adaptively to encompass the social change sought by community members.
Finally, other issues that will need to be further analyzed is whether s 81(1)
essential services by-laws can permissibly have any extra-territorial effect,115 how to
ensure proper enforcement and publication of First Nation by-laws, and providing
community-based, cultural appropriate dispute resolution mechanisms.
V.

CONCLUSION

Although self-government has been recognized as an inherent right of First Nations
people in this country, the preferred method to implement such rights, through
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modern land claim and self-government negotiations, results in the implementation
of these rights being decades away for many First Nations. This problem is
particularly acute because there is a real need for culturally-appropriate legislation
meeting the needs and circumstances of First Nations, in particular in the area of
essential services on reserve. The current model of program devolution does not
allow for this. For reasons of policy (it will produce community-based, culturallyappropriate laws), practicality (Band governments are closest to the citizens affected)
and principle (First Nations have a recognized inherent right to self-government),
these are areas over which First Nation governments ought to be able to exercise
control.
In this paper I have argued that the Indian Act by-law powers, particularly
those enumerated at s 81(1) of the Act, provide jurisdiction to First Nation
governments to pass by-laws in relation to essential services, and there is at least one
valid precedent that exists in this regard. Modern interpretive and constitutional
principles support the conclusion that such by-laws would be both statutorily
authorized and constitutionally valid. Further, the Ministerial power to disallow such
by-laws was finally repealed in December 2014 and no longer stands as a barrier to
passing these laws. Overall, the repeal of the disallowance power for s 81(1)
presents an exciting opportunity which First Nations should certainly explore.

